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I. Introduction
A quarter century ago, there was a very influential paper that shaped thinking on how best to design what we now call the Internet. The article, written by MIT computer scientists Jerome Saltzer, David Clark and David Reed, extolled a design principle called "end-to-end." 1 The idea was to keep the inner part of a computer network as simple as possible and allow the "intelligence"-that is, the ability to prioritize one data packet over another-to reside at the edges of the network closer to the end user.
2 Several leading Internet thinkers, such as Larry
Lessig, have suggested that end-to-end design has given rise to a huge amount of innovation in the ways the Internet is used. 3 By treating all bits equally, and letting the intelligence reside principally at the edges of the network, entrepreneurs can compete to bring consumers new products or applications, or so the argument goes.
Proponents of this grand design have pushed for "net neutrality" legislation, which would discourage Internet access providers from placing any intelligence in the inner part of the network. Their ideal of a "dumb network" would be achieved simply by preventing access providers from charging content providers for priority delivery or other quality enhancements such as guaranteed minimum bandwidth. The net neutrality debate is especially important today for two reasons. First, access providers are in the midst of a multi-billion dollar campaign to upgrade their networks using a mixture of capacity expansion and electronic enhancements to carry broadband content, including multiple HDTV signals. Under net neutrality regulation, access providers would be forced to meet this growing demand with increases in capacity only, which is a very costly solution for both access providers and their subscribers. Second, the prospects for legislation have improved because key Democratic supporters are back in leadership positions.
This essay examines the merits of the end-to-end argument as it relates to the net neutrality debate. First, we review the evidence on the current status of the Internet, concluding that all bits of information are not treated equally from an economic standpoint. Second, we
show that because consumers and businesses place a premium on speed and reliability for certain
Internet services, network owners and specialized service providers have responded to market incentives with customized offerings. We think this is a good thing, though we recognize many net neutrality advocates-who frequently support treating all bits equally in terms of not discriminating-would disagree. Third, we consider our findings in the context of the current legislative proposals involving net neutrality. We argue that these proposals are misguided and extreme-even by the standards of those advocating net neutrality. In particular, the proposals would require an access provider that offered enhanced quality of service to one content provider to make the same level of service quality available to all content providers free of charge. Fourth, we consider some of the problems with regulating prices and quality of service, which is essentially what the net neutrality proponents propose. Pricing flexibility is generally a good thing, and there is no reason to believe that pricing flexibility is not a good thing here. We argue that the antitrust laws are sufficient to police access providers with market power that discriminate among unaffiliated content providers in the provision of service quality.
4

II. The Myth That All Bits Are Treated Equal
The Internet is literally a network of computers. The network moves data to and from those computers. The network includes a set of routers connected by long wires. (1981) . One example of a redundant feature in the middle of the network is the checksum of a file transfer, which adds up the basic components of a message and stores the resulting value. 8 Wikipedia credits the phrase "dumb network" to David Isenberg, a former AT&T Bell Labs employee. See David Isenberg, The Rise of the Stupid Network (HTML), 2.1 ACM NETWORKER (1998), available at http://www.isen.com/index.html. 9 Felten, supra note 3, at 1.
claimed that, by failing to ensure the principle of end-to-end through regulation, the FCC and Congress harm future innovation by causing uncertainty among innovators and entrepreneurs.
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In particular, they argue that content providers will refrain from engaging in innovative activities due to the fact that access providers have the ability to discriminate against content providers on the basis of type of application.
This may sound reasonable, at first blush, but it misses the fact that innovation among content providers does not appear to be slowing. The popularity of online search algorithms created by Yahoo and Google has given way to upstart social networks like MySpace and YouTube.
12 Those who attribute the boom in innovation solely to the Internet's end-to-end nature have not made their case. The Internet is not end-to-end now and was never designed to be strictly neutral.
Most of the early writings on Transfer Communication Protocol/Internet Protocol
(TCP/IP) -the technical rules of the Internet --are contained in a series of informal papers known as Requests for Comments. 13 These papers were not prepared by consultants on behalf of commercial interests. Instead, they functioned much like fodder for a chat room, offering design concepts for the Internet and applications of computer networking.
Interestingly, many of the contributors recognized the need to offer priority to some packets over others. A 1974 Request for Comments, which happened to be co-authored by Google's current chief technologist and, ironically, a major proponent of net neutrality today, explained that outgoing packets should be given priority over other packets to prevent congestion on the ingoing and outgoing pipe. 14 Premises-Based VPN features "intelligent devices such as firewalls or VPN tunneling" and the ability to set appropriate levels of network security, user access control, and bandwidth prioritization. Intelligent Content Distribution Service is a service that can be purchased by content providers to ensure faster delivery of their data. According to the company, "AT&T leverages its own backbone, making AT&T uniquely positioned to find the best way to manage the traffic on content distribution… end users can get the fastest possible download since content is placed on multiple servers located closer to your web viewers."
Broadwing
Converged Services network offers application-based class of service and quality of service options. "Customers can choose ports ranging in speed and may allocate bandwidth in the increments they require." Remote Data Protection is a "secure, network-based data protection service… fully automated remote data backup and recovery service for enterprises and their branch offices."
Global Crossing
IP VPN Service, through class of service and quality of service and associated service level agreements, allows customers to enjoy a high level of performance--"ideal for customers such as government, financial, media, and entertainment organizations."
Qwest
Private Routed Networks (VPN) is a service that offers higher security options for customers, such as protection from denial of service attacks that can cause web pages to be unavailable to the internet.
SAVVIS
Managed IP VPN is a service with "the ability to assign individual service levels to different applications so each application receives the performance levels required, and the customer pays for only what is needed." Content Delivery Network, a service that improves the performance and reliability of web applications, includes the following: caching services that enable the swift delivery of media content; streaming services that enable delivery of single events or libraries of video, music or animated content; intelligent traffic management software that routes "traffic to individual servers based on business rules" and reroutes it whenever performance bottlenecks emerge.
VERIZON
IP VPN Dedicated includes the following features for customers: traffic shaping or bandwidth allocation that provides real-time prioritization of outbound data and access control lists and a router-based firewall that provides a layer of traffic security, protecting against unwanted access to the customers' network. Technologies provides content-acceleration service by caching content closer to the end user for over 2,000 customers. There are also a large number of content providers, ranging from search engines like Google, to businesses like eBay, who make arrangements to get their "products" to the market more quickly and reliably. Google sets up server farms packed with computers to store all of its content for end users. Other firms are providing QoS for applications such as alarm monitoring that require a high degree of security.
There are many applications that depend on QoS to perform properly. Popular QoSneedy applications include streaming multimedia, online gaming, voice over Internet protocol (VoIP), video teleconferencing, alarm signaling, and safety-critical applications such as remote surgery. The quality of a VoIP stream is highly sensitive to both time delay and packets that arrive out of order.
Online gaming provides a good example of how and why all bits are not treated equal by access providers. If there is even a small delay in response time with some games or degradation in the quality of the video stream, product quality declines unacceptably. The suppliers of these games will frequently pay web hosting companies to offer faster and more reliable service than they could achieve with their own servers. They may pass the costs through to their customers.
For example, users pay between $13 and $15 per month to subscribe to the popular multiplayer online role-playing game, World of Warcraft, part of which presumably goes to maintain the quality of the gaming network.
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III. Bit Equality and Net Neutrality Proposals
The net neutrality bills before Congress represent an attempt to regulate the pricing of service quality by an access provider. But as is demonstrated in virtually all other sectors of the economy, pricing flexibility is generally a good thing.
Net neutrality proponents nonetheless argue that access providers wield too much power over content providers when it comes to delivering content to end users, and as a result, these providers cannot be trusted to negotiate fairly for the pricing of service quality. Without such regulation, an access provider might one day attempt to monopolize the content markets by charging excessive prioritization fees to upstart content providers. If upstart content providers are protected by regulators from those surcharges, the argument goes, then they will be encouraged to innovate faster than they do today. Net neutrality proponents argue that ex ante regulation is necessary because the harm from anticompetitive behavior (in terms of less innovation by content providers) could not be remedied appropriately by antitrust courts by either injunctive 18 Rates are available at http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/info/faq/general.html. relief or monetary fines. This line of argument discounts or ignores the fact that ex ante regulation can generate other harms, as described in the following section, that exceed the alleged harms that ostensibly justify net neutrality regulation.
The net neutrality proposals would achieve their objective by imposing nondiscrimination requirements on access providers in the provision of QoS to content providers.
Non-discrimination typically implies similar treatment for similar types of customers. For example, a non-discrimination rule for, say, a newspaper would require that a 2-inch-by-2-inch advertisement cost the same for all advertisers, regardless of the nature of the ad. Nondiscrimination has a superficial appeal, but it is not always consistent with economic efficiency.
Suppose that advertiser A was willing to pay ten times more than advertiser B for a 2-by-2 inch advertisement, but the newspaper is constrained to charge both advertisers the same price.
Economic theory suggests that the total benefits to buyers and sellers can be increased by raising advertiser A's price while slightly lowering advertiser B's price -much the way welfare is increased by charging air travelers who book at the last minute more than vacationers who book months ahead.
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Under each of the net neutrality bills in Congress, however, non-discrimination in the pricing of service quality means something more extreme: If a broadband provider offers enhanced service quality to any individual content provider, then it must offer the same enhanced level of service quality to all content providers for free. The apparent motivation for such a restriction is to stymie efforts by any content provider to secure enhanced service quality from access providers, and instead to force all contracting for service quality to occur between broadband providers and end users. 20 These bills generally do not distinguish between broadband services offered by access providers versus those offered by backbone networks, and they would presumably impose their net neutrality restrictions on both types of networks. Because much of the enhanced QoS in the marketplace today, including local caching of content, resides at the backbone layers of network, those offerings would presumably be in jeopardy. how far the net neutrality proponents are willing to go to achieve bit equality. To understand why the net neutrality proposals represent bad economics, one must first review the key provisions in these bills relating to service quality. One net neutrality bill in the House, H.R. 5273, explains in its preamble that "a network neutrality policy based upon the principle of nondiscrimination is essential to ensure that broadband telecommunications networks, including the Internet, remain open to independent service and content providers." 21 With respect to content providers, the bill would require that access providers "not discriminate in favor of itself in the allocation, use, or quality of broadband services or interconnection with other broadband networks." 22 An access provider must offer the same service quality for its own content and unaffiliated content. 23 Finally, if an access provider offers a given service quality to one content provider, then it must offer the same service quality to all content providers free of charge. 24 Another net neutrality bill, S. 2360, similarly would prevent an access provider from discriminating in the provision of QoS to content providers, 25 and it would ban any charges for QoS. 26 S. 2360 also would deny an access provider from discriminating against either a content provider or end user with respect to bandwidth. 27 Another net neutrality bill, S. 2917, would prevent an access provider from discriminating against a content provider with respect to bandwidth or QoS. 28 Access providers could offer prioritization to end users but could not impose a fee for such service. 29 In summary, under each of the net neutrality proposals, access providers would be severely limited in their offerings to content providers and moderately limited in their offerings to end users. Requiring that service quality be priced at zero for content providers could have dramatic effects on existing contracts between access providers and content providers, as those content providers would presumably seek to renegotiate their terms for service quality once the regulation had passed. Why should online gamers have to pay for QoS under existing contracts while everyone else gets the same service quality for free?
IV. Net Neutrality Is Likely To Produce More Harm Than Good
For at least three reasons, net neutrality regulation is not needed and would likely reduce consumer welfare. First, it is not clear how proactive regulation would generate social benefits in excess of social costs in the presence of antitrust law. Broadband access markets are highly competitive as evidenced by rapidly declining prices and entry by wireless providers. Since 1999, the price of a DSL connection has declined from roughly $80 per month to less than $20 per month. While the absolute price of a cable modem has not declined as rapidly, the qualityadjusted price has declined significantly, as cable modem connection speeds have more than doubled while prices held steady. Where there remains insufficient competition, the government's existing antitrust authority is a sufficient tool to police an access provider's behavior. Suppose that a hypothetical monopoly access provider offers high QoS to an online gaming provider but refuses to sell the same level of QoS to an unaffiliated VoIP provider to protect its affiliated VoIP provider. 30 Antitrust laws police such behavior by not permitting such discriminatory refusals to deal among unaffiliated content providers.
Second, access providers would likely react to the non-discrimination provisions in ways that are harmful for content providers and their end users. An access provider may attempt to comply with a non-discrimination provision in the supply of QoS by either withdrawing its enhanced QoS offering from the marketplace or by replacing its tiered QoS offerings with a onesize-fits-all QoS offering. Under either scenario, consumer welfare associated with the purchase of enhanced QoS would be greatly reduced. To borrow an example from the airline industry, consider a rule that required airlines to charge all customers the same price. One solution to this uniform pricing constraint would be for the airline to replace its first class and economy seats with some blended offering, which was inferior to first class but superior to traditional economy.
To preserve average revenue per customer, the airline would be forced to set the price of the blended offering above the price of the economy seat. Customers who would have preferred to pay a lower price and receive a smaller seat would clearly suffer under such a regime, as would people who can no longer fly due to the higher prices. Moreover, business and first-class travelers who place a high value on sitting in a preferred class would also experience lower utility under such a regime by having to sit with chatty tourists (and the occasional misbehaving child).
Third, content providers interested in designing and producing content that depends critically on QoS would have no means of providing that content, at least not in an acceptable manner. Accordingly, they would likely divert their resources and creative energies to other applications that do not require high service quality. Consider the next generation of online video. Although current video clips may not require high service quality (guaranteed throughput may be required for streaming video), as online video takes on a more interactive nature, it is not much of a stretch to envision how Apple or some other video provider would demand high service quality from access providers. As a condition of investing resources into the development of online video, companies such as Apple and Sony need assurances that contracting for higher service quality with access providers will be legal.
Future welfare depends on innovation by both access providers and content providers. By eliminating or seriously jeopardizing the market for real-time applications, net neutrality legislation would likely reduce consumer welfare for current real-time applications, such as online gaming. It would also dampen the development of new applications that depend critically on quality of service.
V. Conclusion
Although it may have represented a democratic, romantic ideal two decades ago, the endto-end principle is a fiction today and should be treated as such. Policymakers should look at how the Internet really functions from both a technical and an economic perspective. Modern
Shaw "VoIP tax" (Mar. 7, 2006).
